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The End of Grand Strategy: US Maritime Operations in the Twenty-First Century, by Simon Reich
and Peter Dombrowski. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ.
Press, 2017. 252 pages. $30.

As Hal Brands wrote in his 2014 work
What Good Is Strategy? (Cornell Univ.
Press), grand strategy is “very much
in vogue these days” (p. vii). In the
broadest sense, it is a quest to find some
semblance of order in the intricately
complex security environment. The
more disorderly the global security
system, the more expansive the change
under way in this system; and the
more fragile the domestic consensus
on national priorities, the greater the
need for some sort of unifying and
guiding strategy. That is why Americans
desperately are seeking one now.
Even though the body of scholarly
literature on grand strategy is large and
growing, in The End of Grand Strategy
Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski
have made an original, provocative,
and contrarian contribution, arguing
that Americans are inclined toward
a “one-size-fits-all” grand strategy
based on global primacy that has “little
utility in the twenty-first century” (p.
2). Primacy, Reich and Dombrowski
believe, “has become the default option
of American academics and policy makers who deliberate over grand strategy”
(p. 41). This option leads to two major
problems: primacy is no longer feasible
for the United States, and the actual
application of American power, particularly military power, does not reflect
the grand strategy on which Reich and
Dombrowski feel that it is based.
The authors advocate abandoning
the “one-size-fits-all primacist” grand
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strategy and using a flexible array of six
strategies: primacist-hegemony, leadership / cooperative security / unilateral
hegemony, formal sponsorship, informal
sponsorship, isolationist retrenchment,
and restrained retrenchment. Reich
and Dombrowski then provide six
maritime case studies to illustrate that
the United States already is using this
array of strategies even while claiming
to use a unitary one-size-fits-all one.
This argument makes sense if—and
only if—the authors’ conceptualization
of grand strategy is accurate. But has
anyone outside the academy ever
claimed that there is a discernible,
unitary American grand strategy that
dictates the application of national
power? The authors write: “By definition, the architectural design of any
single, abstract strategy is relatively
rigid if not indeed static—intellectually,
conceptually, analytically, and organizationally” (pp. 167–68). But outside
the academy, there is no “single,
abstract” U.S. grand strategy. There
never has been and never will be.
A case can be made that what Reich
and Dombrowski are describing is
the natural and enduring distinction
between theoretical grand strategies,
which often strive for logical consistency
and internal coherence, and applied
strategy. Just as no military operation
ever perfectly reflects the operational
plan behind it, there never is perfect
congruity between a theoretical grand
strategy and the practice of strategy.
That is the reason that the grand strategic guidelines that the U.S. government
uses to guide its action—particularly
the congressionally mandated National
Security Strategy documents—do not
constitute coherent, logically consistent
grand strategies for a theorist or scholar.
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In practice, American political leaders
use the national grand strategy, be it primacy or something else, as a shorthand
way of explaining the complex security
environment to the public and its elected
representatives, and as a very broad and
pliable set of historically derived best
practices and aspirations. No policy
maker ever made a decision and no military leader ever crafted a theater strategy
or operational plan because it was what
the grand strategy demanded. As John
Gaddis phrased it in On Grand Strategy
(Penguin Random House, 2018), grand
strategy is simply “the alignment of
potentially unlimited aspirations with
necessarily limited capabilities” (p. 21).
It is a constantly shifting web of patterns
and habits blending both aspirations
and predilections, a creed, even a myth,
and not something prescriptive, such
as a legal code. Outright dissonance
between its theory and its practice
would be worrisome, but some level of
incongruity is normal, even inevitable.
While theorists of grand strategy talk
of primacy, in reality the United States
is focused more on maintaining the
system it created rather than trying to
dominate it. Thus the configuration of
the U.S. military, which is derived from
a practice of reasonably being prepared
for low-probability/high-risk threats
such as major war, while devoting most
of its effort to system-maintenance
missions, makes sense. Ultimately, Reich
and Dombrowski’s contention that the
United States is at the end of grand strategy does not stand up if grand strategy
is conceptualized as a set of if/then statements or rules of thumb, as a shorthand
way of communicating and building
consensus rather than official writ.
That said, The End of Grand Strategy is
a challenging, erudite, and worthwhile
read. It is unusual in its use of sea

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol72/iss2/11

NWC_Spring2019Review.indb 114

power to illustrate its points. It is
right about the enduring centrality
of American naval power. It is right
that a “new” grand strategy is not the
solution to America’s security problems.
However, to borrow from Mark Twain,
the authors’ report of the death of grand
strategy may be an exaggeration.
STEVEN METZ

Hell on Earth, by Avigdor Hameiri, trans. Peter
C. Appelbaum. Detroit, MI: Wayne State Univ.
Press, 2017. 478 pages. $39.99.

War memoirs and war literature
frequently intersect. Because of the
traumas and tragedies of war and the
impact they have on individuals, it is
not uncommon for authors to write
of their experiences of war using
fiction to give voice to both literary
creativity and personal experience. Karl
Marlantes’s powerful novel Matterhorn
(Grove, 2010) is one example, written
about his experience of the Vietnam
War as a Marine officer. So also are
the writings of Israeli author Avigdor
Hameiri (1890–1970) a reflection of the
author’s experience of an earlier war.
Born in the village of Odavidhaza,
in Carpathian Ruthenia in AustriaHungary (near present-day Mukacheve,
western Ukraine), Hameiri fought
in World War I as a soldier in the
Austro-Hungarian army and recounted
his experiences in two fictionalized
memoirs, The Great Madness (1929;
translation published by Vantage, 1952)
and Hell on Earth (original-language
publication, 1932). The former recounts
experiences of a Jewish soldier on
the eastern front, while the latter, the
translation of which is the subject of this
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